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ON HUMAN RATIONALITY AND GOVERNMENT CONTROL 
 
 





Abstract: In this paper we first address a long-standing criticism of human rationality 
and what that means for the role of government. We review and compare much of the 
literature on rationality and demonstrate that various authors within various fields 
often mean very different things by the word “rational.” While we make no claims as to 
whether or not humans always behave rationally, we point out the flawed logic for 
what is suggested for the role of government as a way of addressing the human 
irrationality problem. Building on the Mises-Rothbard-Huerta de Soto tradition, we 
argue that what is more important than perfect rationality is purposeful action. We 
explain the dynamic nature of the market in which time plays an important role, and 
humans act with expectations to accomplish goals, learn from past mistakes, discover 
new information and modify their plans accordingly. Using Hayek’s approach, we 
discuss the knowledge problem in which data is dispersed among millions of 
individuals (unknown in its entirety to any central authority) as well as the problems 
with applying the scientific method exactly as it is used in the natural sciences to the 
human behavioral sciences. These problems combined, we argue, make for a much 
more disastrous system than would be a system in which often-irrational individuals 
would be free to make mistakes for themselves, discover new information and take 
actions for their own betterment. 
 
Key Words: Rationality, Government intervention, Equilibrium, Human Action, 
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CONFLICT OF VISIONS AND RATIONALITY 
 
Why do beliefs cluster the way they do? 
 If someone believes that only police and military should have guns, why is that 
person also likely to support socialized healthcare, a government-imposed minimum 
wage, and be unsupportive of school vouchers? In his 1987 book A Conflict of Visions: 
Ideological Origins of Political Struggles, economist Thomas Sowell put forth two 
conflicting visions of man that he believes explain many of the underlying reasons for 
the clustering of beliefs. 
In Sowell’s ‘Constrained Vision’, man’s nature is flawed, selfish and fixed. It seeks to 
deal with the flaws of man’s nature by erecting institutions with restraints: separation of 
powers, constitutions, etc. Those who employ the Constrained Vision see abuses of 
power by leaders (Napoleon Bonaparte, Kim Jong-un, and yes – most political leaders 
of modern democratic nations) as inevitable due to the shortfalls of man’s nature. For 
this reason, limitations must be placed on the institutions themselves so that it is more 
difficult for any one individual to abuse them. The idea is to decentralize power so that 
man’s flaws are not catastrophic. 
The ‘Unconstrained Vision’, by contrast, sees abuses of power as being caused by 
not having chosen the right leaders or established the right kinds of institutions. 
«Implicit, – writes Sowell (2007, p. 18) – is the notion that the potential is very different 
from the actual, and that means exist to improve human nature toward its potential, or 
that such means can be evolved or discovered, so that man will do the right thing for 
the right reason rather than for ulterior psychic or economic rewards». And central to 
the Unconstrained Vision is the notion that human beings are highly malleable and can 
be trained in the service of some ideal.  
Steven Pinker’s 2002 book The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature builds 
on much of Sowell’s work. He refers to Sowell’s Constrained and Unconstrained 
Visions as the Tragic and Utopian Visions, respectively. He argues that much of the 
Unconstrained Vision is rooted in the false belief that individuals are born with no pre-
programmed software (or innate human nature). This blank slate (or tabula rasa) belief, 
he explains, was often based on good intentions. After all, if we are born equal in every 
way, this could eradicate inequality, but the problem is that the human mind does, in 
fact, come with certain innate biological programming, as the human behavioral 
sciences have already demonstrated. The following two paragraphs, in Pinker’s own 
words, explain the two visions and key intellectuals associated with each: 
 
In the Tragic Vision, humans are inherently limited in knowledge, wisdom, and virtue, and all 
social arrangements must acknowledge those limits. “Mortal things suit mortals best,” wrote 
Pindar; “from the crooked timber of humanity no truly straight thing can be made,” wrote Kant. 
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The Tragic Vision is associated with Hobbes, Burke, Smith, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, 
the jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., the economists Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, the 
philosophers Isaiah Berlin and Karl Popper, and the legal scholar Richard Posner. 
[…] 
In the Utopian Vision, psychological limitations are artifacts that come from our social 
arrangements, and we should not allow them to restrict our gaze from what is possible in a better 
world. Its creed might be “Some people see things as they are and ask ‘why?’; I dream things that 
never were and ask ‘why not?’” The quotation is often attributed to the icon of 1960s liberalism 
Robert F. Kennedy, but was originally penned by the Fabian socialist George Bernard Shaw (who 
also wrote, “There is nothing that can be changed more completely than human nature when the 
job is taken in hand early enough”). The Utopian Vision is also associated with Rousseau, Godwin, 
Condorcet, Thomas Paine, the jurist Earl Warren, the economist John Kenneth Galbraith, and to a 
lesser extent the political philosopher Ronald Dworkin. (Pinker, 2002, pp. 287-288). 
 
We could summarize the visions as follows:3 
 
Unconstrained/Utopian Vision of Man Constrained/Tragic Vision of Man 
Sees man’s nature as malleable and perfectible. Sees man’s nature as flawed, selfish and fixed 
Believes that society should be led by the 
strongest and most capable among us and under 
the right institutions. 
Believes that all people should be restrained in 
what they should be able to do. Believes political 
leaders to be of the same flawed, selfish and fixed 
nature as everyone else, thus the importance of 
separation of powers, constitutions, etc. 
Judges laws by their intentions. Judges laws by their effects. 
Favors human action motivated by selflessness 
and sincerity. 
Less concerned with motives behind human 
action as long as interactions between individuals 
are positive-sum. 
Sees racism, crime, etc. as a socially-learned 
phenomenon.  
Sees racism, crime, etc. as just part of man’s 
flawed, selfish, and fixed nature. 
Seeks to explain the causes of war, poverty, crime. Sees war, poverty and crime as having been the 
norm throughout human history (due to man’s 
flawed, selfish and fixed nature) and instead seeks 
to explain the causes of peace, wealth, law and 
order and morality. 
Sees market economies as «obeying the power of 
particular interests, and should therefore be made 
in the future to obey the power of the public 
interest» (Robinson, 2008, p. 9). This vision seeks 
to define the public interest by itself.  
Sees market economies as «responsive to systemic 
forces, the interaction of innumerable individual 
choices and performances» (Robinson, 2008, p. 9). 
Seeks economic and social equality «even if the 
means chosen imply great inequality in the right 
to decide such issues and choose such means» 
(Sowell, 2007, p. 55). 
Seeks equality through freedom of choice. 
  
                                                          
3 Much of the content for this section including the table was reused with permission from the 
Foundation for Economic Education from Phaneuf (2013). 
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Points to human irrationality as proof that the 
strongest and most capable among us must lead. 
Less concerned with whether or not individuals 
always behave rationally. Emphasizes that leaders 
come from the same pool of flawed, selfish and 
fixed human beings. 
 
None of this is to say that a given person cannot hold political beliefs characterized 
by both visions. This is often the case. «Not all social thinkers fit this schematic 
dichotomy. John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx, for example, do not fit for very different 
reasons». And, we add, Hayek’s and Popper’s positions are much more complex than 
what could be argued from the table. «Others take midway positions between the two 
visions, or convert from one to the other. However, the conflict of visions is no less real 
because everyone has not chosen sides or irrevocably committed themselves»4 (2007, p. 
33). As Pinker (2002, p. 287) explains, «[n]ot every ideological struggle fits [Sowell’s] 
scheme, but as we say in social science, he has identified a factor that can account for a 
large proportion of the variance».  
What is relevant from Sowell’s Visions to the topic of this paper is the question 
concerning human rationality (see the bottom row in the table). In fact, it could be said, 
that this paper spawned as a response to the common critiques about rationality of 
intellectuals and schools of thought said to be proponents of free markets. Many of us 
have heard statements like «the problem with Milton Friedman’s work is that it 
assumes that humans behave rationally», or «the problem with the Austrian school of 
economics is that it is based upon the fallacy that humans are rational actors»5. 
Sowell’s A Conflict of Visions gives valuable insight into the how rationality is seen by 
economists, which is worth quoting in length. 
 
Classical and neo-classical economics, especially of the Austrian school, exemplify this 
constrained vision of systemic rationality, in which individual articulation means little. In an 
uncontrolled market, as seen in this vision, changing prices, wages, and interest rates adjust the 
economy to shifting demands, technological changes, and evolving skills— without any of the 
actors in this drama knowing or caring how his individual responses affect the whole. It can be 
analyzed as a general process of interaction with its own characteristic patterns and results— 
otherwise there would be no Austrian economics— but cannot be specified in such concrete detail 
as to make it feasible for any individual or group to plan or control the actual process. The 
rationality in it is systemic, not individual— and such individual rationality as may exist is largely 
incidental, so that the much-vexed question as to just how rational man is has little relevance in 
this vision. (Sowell, 2007, p. 18). 
 
We begin our discussion on rationality with the context that Sowell has provided. 
 
                                                          
4 Sowell (2007), p. 33. 
5 We use Friedman as an example to demonstrate that the statement is often said for neoclassical 





HUMAN RATIONALITY: DEFINITIONS AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS 
 
Sowell’s categorization can get us into trouble if we are not careful, but it can also 
offer some elements to go further into the discussion. In fact, behind the Utopian and 
Tragic Visions described by the authors, we can find a more general belief about human 
rationality. And the way in which we answer the question “are humans rational?” 
manifests even more general perspectives on humanity, freedom and political control. 
What we will try to do is to develop a different answer to the question above – an 
answer, rooted in the Mises-Rothbard-Huerta de Soto tradition, that allows us to go 
beyond the utopian/tragic conflict, in order to categorize less but understand more. 
The question as to whether humans behave rationally and to what extent has been a 
topic of high controversy between the various human behavioral sciences for decades. 
As of recent years two intellectuals in particular, Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. 
Sunstein, have gained a great deal of attention from legislators and the academic 
community by arguing that since humans do not always behave rationally, both the 
private and public sectors can act as choice architects and ‘nudge’ individuals toward 
choices with more favorable outcomes without restricting human freedom. They label 
this approach by coining the term ‘libertarian paternalism’. Additionally, psychologist 
and winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics Daniel Kahneman has argued that humans 
are «not well described by the rational-agent model» and therefore supports libertarian 
paternalism as introduced by Thaler and Sunstein (2011, p. 411). 
In this paper we present our defense of liberty against a decades-old debate 
concerning human rationality. Beyond this we ask the questions, “If humans do not 
behave rationally should that determine the role of government? If so, to what extent?”. 
Our paper is of important timing due to a number of publications of the past few years 
within the human behavioral sciences. We discuss two New York Times Bestsellers in 
particular. Although we strongly disagree what these two books suggest for the role of 
government, we point out that they are still excellent sources for understanding human 
behavior. And lastly, we also cite several other works throughout this paper in order to 
enrich the context of the intellectual debate. It is important to point out that although 
some authors may agree with Thaler, Sunstein and Kahneman that humans do not 
always behave rationally, this does not mean that they necessarily agree with Thaler, 
Sunstein and Kahneman about the proper role of government. For this reason, it must 
be said that our critiques are only directed toward some of the arguments from the 
three authors we named here. 
The first book is Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness, a 
behavioral economics book – initially printed in 2008 and coauthored by Richard H. 
Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein – expands on a concept that the authors call “libertarian 
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paternalism,” which was first coined by the same authors in a 2003 article printed in 
The American Economic Review. 
Libertarian paternalism holds that it is possible «to steer people’s choices [for both 
the public and private sector] in directions that will improve their lives […] as judged 
by themselves»6. This is done through the concept of choice architecture, which borrows 
from human behavioral sciences to present choices in certain ways that would make it 
more likely for the choice architect (the person(s) presenting the choices) to influence 
the choice of a decision-maker in one direction or another. In choice architecture, softly 
steering choices is referred to as “nudging.”  
We must mention here that it is only toward usage of choice architecture in the 
public sector that we offer any critique. In the private sector, individuals are truly free. 
If they do not like choices offered, they can go elsewhere for other options. In the public 
sector, by contrast, limited (forced) options are presented. We also refute the claim that 
it is possible to be both libertarian and paternalistic at the same time. In Nudge, Thaler 
and Sunstein (2008, p. 5) claim that libertarian paternalism is «liberty preserving». In 
reality, however, liberty means “free,” and paternal means “of or pertaining to a 
father.” Our second refutation is that governments can maintain the proper role of 
preserving liberty and justice while doing much of the nudging that Thaler and 
Sunstein propose. 
The second book which we bring to the table for debate is Thinking Fast and Slow, a 
cognitive psychology book by Daniel Kahneman. The book was built upon an entire 
career of working with his collaborator Amos Tversky. The book has deservingly 
received a great deal of praise by many, including two economists generally associated 
with free markets: William Easterly and David Friedman, of the Chicago school and son 
of Milton Friedman. On Friedman’s website and blog he posts drafts for the upcoming 
third edition of his book The Machinery of Freedom. He writes, «The best, and most 
interesting, challenge to rationality that I have seen is Thinking Fast and Slow by Daniel 
Kahneman, a psychologist who won a Nobel prize in economics and, in my opinion, 
deserved it»7. 
To claim that Kahneman argues that humans are irrational actors would be too 
simplistic. It does seem that he tries to go to great effort throughout the book to 
demonstrate that humans are irrational actors. But in the conclusion he adds some 
perspective: 
 
I often cringe when my work with Amos is credited with demonstrating that human choices 
are irrational, when in fact our research only showed that Humans are not well described by the 
rational-agent model. 
                                                          
6 Thaler and Sunstein (2008), p. 5. 
7 Friedman (2011). 
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Although Humans are not irrational, they often need help to make more accurate judgments 
and better decisions, and in some cases policies and institutions can provide that help. (Kahneman, 
2011, p. 411). 
 
To Kahneman (2011, p. 412), this provides the justification needed for governments 
to maintain a soft but evident paternal role in the lives of citizens. The book’s 
conclusion also offers praise for Thaler and Sunstein and calls Nudge “the bible of 
behavioral economics.” He also frames Milton Friedman as a sort of poster child for the 
side of the intellectual debate that argues that humans should be free to make their own 
choices because they behave rationally. Kahneman cites Friedman’s book Free to Choose 
in support of his claim. 
In international relations, like in economics, students are taught the rational model 
of decision making. This model holds that all levels of decision-makers make decisions 
rationally – weighing options, calculating risks and competing interests, and eventually 
choosing the best option (or at least the least bad option) among the choices available. 
This model can be used as lens for observing, interpreting and predicting behavior at all 
levels: the individual level, domestic (or state) level, interstate (international) level, and 
global level8. Under this framework, the seemingly irrational behavior of an 
authoritarian figure like Kim Jong-un or of a nation like North Korea can be understood 
and often predicted when the major incentives and punishments are known by the 
observer. Within this framework it could also be argued that even heroin use is rational 
behavior – not because its effects on the human body are ‘not so bad’ but because the 
user merely prefers the short-term pleasure over long-term health. The behavior is 
rationalized in the user’s mind. Especially if the user had already developed an 
addiction, an observer with understanding of the rational model would not be shocked 
to see the user using again. Many in related fields of academia would claim that, at least 
according to the rational model of decision making, the logic follows. 
In the field of economics the equivalent model is referred to as ‘rational choice 
theory’. In fact, the drug use example was argued by two professors of the Chicago 
School of Economics, Kevin M. Murphy and Gary Becker, and Kahneman makes note of 
this in his book. In 1988, Murphy and Becker (1988, p. 675) coauthored a paper called A 
Theory of Rational Addiction. In this paper, ‘rational’ is defined as «a consistent plan to 
maximize utility over time». By this definition, individuals can make decisions for 
short-term gains with harmful and even fatal long-term consequences and still be 
considered to behave rationally. 
Daniel Kahneman points out his problem with this definition: 
 
The only test of rationality is not whether a person’s beliefs and preferences are reasonable, but 
whether they are internally consistent. A rational person can believe in ghosts so long as all her 
                                                          
8 Goldstein and Whitworth (2005), p. 85. 
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other beliefs are consistent with the existence of ghosts. A rational person can prefer being hated 
over being loved, so long as his preferences are consistent. Rationality is a logical coherence—
reasonable or not. (Kahneman, 2011, p. 411). 
 
In the traditional sense of the word rational refers to ‘showing clear thought or 
reason’. Reason, unlike intuition, requires an active cognitive process of fact verification 
and use of logic. One common critique of rationality is that humans are highly 
susceptible to the framing technique. That is, the same information can be presented in 
different ways, but supposedly rational humans make different choices depending on 
how information is presented. One example from Kahneman’s book is as follows: 
A patient is fatally ill but could survive by undergoing a surgery. A doctor can likely 
influence the patient to undergo the surgery by stating the she has a ninety percent 
chance of survival with the surgery. Similarly, the doctor could frame the circumstance 
in a different light by stating that there is a ten percent chance that the surgery will be 
fatal. The information is said to be the same; however, the ‘supposedly rational’ patient 
may make a different decision based on how the information is presented9. 
The logic seems sound, and there is something to be said about framing and 
rationality. Nonetheless, Pinker’s book The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window into 
Human Nature provides a counter-argument stating that just because humans can be 
persuaded one way or another with the technique that this is  
 
not necessarily irrational. Different ways of framing a situation may be equally consistent with 
the facts being described in that very sentence, but they make different commitments about other 
facts which are not being described… To take the most obvious example, taxes and membership fees 
are not two ways of framing the same thing: if you choose not to pay a membership fee, the 
organization will cease to provide you with its services, but if you choose not to pay taxes, men 
with guns will put you in jail… Debaters who frame an event in these two ways are making 
competing predictions about unobserved facts, just like scientists who examine the same data and 
advance competing theories that can be distinguished by new empirical tests. (Pinker, 2007, p. 260). 
 
In evolutionary psychology, ‘rational’ action in terms of utility maximization (in the 
same sense that economics generally refers to utility maximization) is far too simplistic. 
In Gad Saad’s book The Consuming Instinct: What Juicy Burgers, Ferraris, Pornography, and 
Gift Giving Reveal about Human Nature, the author argues that rational choices are made 
through four overriding Darwinian pursuits: survival, reproduction, kin selection, and 
reciprocity.  
 
[D]eep rationality proposes that individuals apply decision rules that would have maximized 
their fitness (capacity to propagate one's genes) when tackling adaptive challenges in specific 
domains (e.g., mate search, kin protection, predator avoidance, maintenance of status). In this 
                                                          
9 Kahneman (2011), p. 88. 
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sense, the metric of rationality should be defined according to an understanding of our ancestors’ 
“deep evolutionary time” (i.e., our evolutionary history). (Saad, 2011, p. 269).  
 
In The Virtue of Selfishness – a collection of essays published in 1964 – Ayn Rand and 
Nathaniel Branden present the objectivist view of reason and rationality. According to 
Rand, objectivism holds that reason is the basic means of survival. She does not argue 
that man behaves rational in every instance, but rather, that he has the choice to behave 
rationally and that doing so is essential to his survival. Quoting John Galt’s speech from 
Atlas Shrugged she writes 
 
Man has been called a rational being, but rationality is a matter of choice—and the alternative 
his nature offers him is: rational being or suicidal animal. Man has to be man—by choice; he has to 
hold his life as a value—by choice; he has to learn to sustain it by choice… (Rand, 1964, p. 23). 
 
In a later chapter, Branden writes that  
 
An individualist is, first and foremost, a man of reason. It is upon the ability to think, upon his 
rational faculty, that man’s life depends; rationality is the precondition of independence and self-
reliance. (Rand, 1964, p. 136). 
 
To demonstrate just how much the concepts of rationality differ so drastically, we 
will compare here the objectivist concept of rationality to that of evolutionary 
psychology. Rationality, as Rand and Branden define it, means using clear thought and 
reason to take certain actions necessary for one’s survival. While their definition 
concentrates on the survival of the individual, evolutionary psychology brings it a step 
further in that rational actions are those that are taken for the survival of one’s genes. 
This expands the concept of rationality beyond one’s self to one’s offspring and kin, 
since after all, relatives share a percentage of the genes. Beyond this, evolutionary 
history must be used as a lens for understanding behavior.  
Kahneman (2003, p. 698) explains how the brain works through dual process theory. 
The theory holds that the brain processes information through two basic systems. These 
systems are labeled ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’. System 1, known as the intuition or 
automatic system is fast, parallel, automatic, effortless, associative, slow-learning, and 
emotional. It is well-suited to answer questions such as the product of 2 × 2 but not 17 × 
24. System 2 – known as the reasoning system – is, by contrast, slow, serial, controlled, 
effortful, rule-governed, flexible, and neutral. For most people, System 2 is needed to 
find the answer to more complicated questions, such as the product of 17 × 2410.  
In Nudge, Thaler and Sunstein expand upon dual process theory and coin two terms: 
Humans and Econs. Humans, according to the framework they propose, Humans 
predictably err. The example given in the book is the “planning fallacy” in which 
                                                          
10 Kahneman (2011), p. 23. 
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Humans should be able to predict that a contractor would likely fail to meet deadlines, 
as most seem to do. Human seem to fail to consider all the options when presented to 
them, are susceptible to the framing effect, are unable to make complex calculations 
effortlessly, and are impulsive in decision-making. Econs, by contrast, «are not required 
to make perfect forecasts […] but are required to make unbiased forecasts. That is, the 
forecasts can be wrong, but they can’t be systematically wrong in a predictable 
direction»11. Econs are not susceptible to the framing effect, are able to make complex 
calculations effortlessly, and are not impulsive. 
Thaler and Sunstein argue that since actual human beings are hardly the rational 
actors that Econs are, choices can be presented to Humans in a way that will nudge 
them in the right direction. They suggest that this can through a concept that they call 
“choice architecture.” Under choice architecture, the person presenting choices (or 
choice architect) to the chooser, while knowing which choices would most benefit most 
individuals, can follow certain guidelines to ‘nudge’ those individuals toward certain 
directions. The acronym ‘NUDGES’ is used: iNcentives, Understanding mappings, 
Defaults, Give feedback, Expect error, Structure complex choices.  
Our argument is that choice architecture is an excellent concept when used in the 
private sector. One good example proposed by the authors goes as follows: The choice 
architects of gas pumps (engineers, in this case) for ‘pay at the pump’ gas stations can 
design the pumps to accept credit cards no matter which way the consumer puts the 
credit card into the machine. Since not every consumer consistently follows directions 
in the image on the pump showing the correct way to enter the card, consumers can 
benefit from well-designed choice architecture, and no freedom is restricted. This would 
be one such implementation of the “Expect error” aspect of the ‘NUDGES’ acronym. We 
argue that (this being a private sector solution) is a great concept and is consistent with 
libertarian values, assuming that the designing of the gas pump is done by a private 
company with no taxpayer money. 
One more such example of choice architecture proposed by Thaler and Sunstein 
demonstrates how defaults are used in presenting choices (the “D” in ‘NUDGES’). For 
example, in offering government healthcare benefits, the authors argue that the choice 
architect must understand which choices would benefit most people. The default option 
could be auto-enrollment in the option that most participants are likely to prefer, or the 
default could also be set to non-enrollment and require each participant to read through 
the benefits of each choice before choosing. We argue that this case – being government-
offered healthcare – is completely inconsistent with libertarian values. Don’t get us 
wrong; the idea of understanding how defaults and the rest of choice architecture is 
great! For example, a private company offering private healthcare benefits to its 
employees could set the default to be auto-enrollment in the healthcare plan that most 
                                                          
11 Thaler and Sunstein (2008), p. 7. 
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people could best benefit from – especially since most people are unlikely to read 
through all the paperwork detailing each plan. For the private sector, choice 
architecture is an excellent concept. Remember: in the private sector, individuals are 
truly free to choose; they can always quit working for a particular employer, for 
example, if they do not like benefits of the job.  
It is not that the authors do not propose any libertarian solutions for the public 
sector at all. For example, they do propose that the government drop its monopoly on 
the definition of marriage. In this case the government would maintain the role of 
treating marriage as a contract between two free individuals, regardless of gender. Our 
problem with libertarian paternalism is that most ideas proposed in Nudge are within 
the framework of maximizing choice within government-offered solutions. In this 
sense, there is nothing libertarian about libertarian paternalism. It may be a softer 
paternalism, but it is completely incompatible with the market economy that is so 
fundamental to classic liberal values. Thaler and Sunstein do suggest that individuals 
could have the freedom to opt out of certain government programs; this, in their view, 
makes libertarian paternalism consistent with libertarianism. And to be fair, they do 
argue that individuals should be free to not have to pay taxes for government programs 
in some cases, assuming those individuals opt out. A couple of examples include 
schooling (the authors promote school vouchers) and lottery tickets. Nonetheless, it 
seems that Thaler and Sunstein do not recognize the overwhelming tendency for 
governments to grow ever larger and more restrictive of individual choice – as they 
have always done. They also seem out of touch with government’s tendency toward 
inefficiency and waste. And lastly, it must be mentioned again that Thaler and Sunstein 
(2008, p. 7) begin their argument by building on the fact that «research has raised 
serious questions about the rationality of many judgments and decisions that people 
make». Whether or not humans are rational actors is not our point here. Our point is 
that Thaler and Sunstein’s arguments fail to recognize that governments in a poor 
position to nudge individuals toward optimal choices since they are comprised by 
human beings of the same planet. (We discuss this in greater detail shortly).  
Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p. 5) also use Milton Friedman’s name to win over 
readers that are sympathetic to libertarian arguments. In the authors’ own introduction 
they write: «To borrow a phrase from the late Milton Friedman, libertarian paternalists 
urge that people should be ‘free to choose’». Unfortunately, Nudge was printed two 
years after Milton Friedman’s death, so he was, therefore, unable to point out for 
himself the illiberal aspects of libertarian paternalism and disassociate his ideas from 
that of Thaler and Sunstein. 
Do Thaler and Sunstein believe in libertarian ideas and limited government? If they 
were offered ‘keys to the kingdom’, would they maintain the softer paternalism, or 
would they force big government upon the people? The last chapter of Nudge (called 
“The Real Third Way”) speaks for itself. Instead of abiding by their claim that they, like 
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Milton Friedman, want individuals to be “free to choose,” they instead admit their book 
is an attempt to balance right-wing and left-wing politics. 
In 2009, Sunstein received a presidential appointment to the Administrator of the 
White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs – a position he held until 
2012. No doubt, his intentions were to do good for society, but nonetheless, he sought to 
govern and to regulate. In his mind, his intellectual knowledge was far superior to the 
mundane knowledge of 300 million Americans. 
But even before Nudge made it to print, Sunstein had already published a different 
book pushing hard paternalism called The Second Bill of Rights: FDR's Unfinished 
Revolution And Why We Need It More Than Ever. In the book he states (while partially 
reiterating a quote from FDR):  
 
Freedom from fear is inextricably linked to freedom from want. Liberty and citizenship are 
rooted in opportunity and security. In a sense, America lives under the second bill. But in another 
sense, we have lost sight of it. The second bill of rights should be reclaimed in its nation of origin. 
(Sunstein, 2004, p. 234). 
 
For the readers unfamiliar with the Second Bill of Rights (often referred to in politics 
as the Economic Bill of Rights), as proposed by FDR himself in his 1944 State of the 
Union Address, we quote part of it here: 
 
The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the 
nation; 
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation; 
The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a return which will give him and his 
family a decent living; 
The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an atmosphere of freedom from 
unfair competition and domination by monopolies at home or abroad; 
The right of every family to a decent home; 
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health; 
The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and 
unemployment; 
The right to a good education.12 
 
In sum, FDR proposed that the limited role of government be shifted from 
recognizing the self-evident truth that individuals had been endowed with the rights to 
life, liberty and pursuit of happiness to that of guaranteeing freedom from all want. Just 
how exactly FDR intended to pay for houses, education, healthcare, food, clothing, as 
well as a much expanded labor force new government departments that would be used 
to “protect” businessmen from competition and monopolies and deliver these 
protections from all want without infringing on the already established right to liberty, 
                                                          
12 Franklin D. Roosevelt American Heritage Center. 
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pursuit of happiness was not addressed in the speech. Rights were no longer self-
evident, coming from God or nature. They were now self-evident, coming from 
something that FDR and his advisors had simply drawn up with a pen and with plans 
to impose them upon the American taxpayer.  
To demonstrate the libertarian perspective on government-rationed rights, we 
compare FDR’s perspective on rights to that of Frédéric Bastiat, a 19th Century French 
theorist and hero of libertarian circles as well as Austrian economists. Here we quote 
Bastiat’s book The Law: 
   
The Socialists say, since the law organizes justice, why should it not organize labor, instruction, 
and religion? 
Why? Because it could not organize labor, instruction, and religion, without disorganizing 
justice. 
For remember, that law is force, and that consequently the domain of the law cannot properly 
extend beyond the domain of force. 
When law and force keep a man within the bounds of justice, they impose nothing upon him 
but a mere negation. They only oblige him to abstain from doing harm. They violate neither his 
personality, his liberty, nor his property. They only guard the personality, the liberty, the property 
of others. They hold themselves on the defensive; they defend the equal right of all. They fulfill a 
mission whose harmlessness is evident, whose utility is palpable, and whose legitimacy is not to be 
disputed. This is so true that, as a friend of mine once remarked to me, to say that the aim of the 
law is to cause justice to reign, is to use an expression that is not rigorously exact. It ought to be 
said, the aim of the law is to prevent injustice from reigning. In fact, it is not justice that has an 
existence of its own, it is injustice. The one results from the absence of the other. 
But when the law, through the medium of its necessary agent—force—imposes a form of labor, 
a method or a subject of instruction, a creed, or a worship, it is no longer negative; it acts positively 
upon men. It substitutes the will of the legislator for their own will, the initiative of the legislator 
for their own initiative. They have no need to consult, to compare, or to foresee; the law does all 
that for them. The intellect is for them a useless encumbrance; they cease to be men; they lose their 
personality, their liberty, their property. (Bastiat, 2007, p. 64). 
 
During the Enlightenment period, John Locke’s Second Treatise of Civil Government 
described natural rights as life, liberty, estate (meaning property). Thomas Jefferson 
borrowed from Locke and described them as life, liberty, pursuit of happiness in the 
Declaration of Independence. Bastiat (who lived after Enlightenment philosophers) 
described these as individuality or personality, liberty and property. While neither 
Locke nor Jefferson fully practiced what they preached – Locke gave provisions for 
slavery in the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina in Articles 107 and 110; Jefferson had 
slaves himself – their words provided the intellectual arguments that were later finally 
recognized by governments around the world. Pinker has made similar arguments: 
  
[T]hough [Locke] and many of his intellectual descendants hypocritically profited from the 
institution [of slavery], their advocacy of liberty, equality, and the universal rights of man let a 
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genie out of the bottle and made it increasingly awkward for anyone to justify the practice. (Pinker, 
2011, p. 155). 
 
For those that have a hard time accepting the concept of natural rights, consider the 
opposite. To say that you do not have the right to life is to say that others may to take it 
whenever it suits them. To say that you do not have the right to liberty is to say that 
others have the right to make you a slave. Do others have the right to steal your home, 
car or other property? Do others have the right to restrict your pursuit of your own 
values when those pursuits are harmless to all others? If you can come to the conclusion 
that the answer to these questions is “no,” then the next question is: “What makes you 
so special?”. If others have no right to infringe on your natural rights, what gives you 
the right to do so to others? 
It is through the recognition of the self-evident truths proposed during 
Enlightenment that many libertarians (or classic liberals) derive their arguments for 
both liberty and equality.13 While socialism seeks to use government to ensure equality 
of outcome, libertarian values (free markets being among the most fundamental of 
these) seek equality through liberty. They recognize that “Jefferson made it clear that he 
was referring to an equality of rights, not a biological sameness.”14 
The problem with adding material rights (beyond the right to accumulate property 
by voluntary exchange) and collective rights is that they come at the expense of the 
natural rights of individuals. Take the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, for 
example: the eradication of poverty and hunger, universal education, gender equality, 
child health, maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, environmental sustainability, and 
global partnership. The Goals began in 2000 and are hoped to be achieved by 2015. 
Among the proponents are a number of world renowned celebrities, actors and 
actresses, athletes, and even a princess. U2’s Bono and ‘rock star economist’ Jeffrey 
Sachs, a Colombia University professor, are just two individuals that have received a 
great deal of attention for their support. 
So once natural rights are established, what can be said for planning? No discussion 
of the role of government and central planning would be complete without a discussion 
of knowledge itself. Sowell (2007, p. 13) distinguishes between intellectual and 
mundane knowledge in his book Intellectuals and Society. He rebukes intellectuals for 
thinking that they can somehow do good for society by means of centralized planning. 
All the intellectual knowledge needed to understand the complexities of the sea or the 
engineering required for shipbuilding could not have prevented the sinking of the 
                                                          
13 Many libertarians come to similar conclusions on strictly utilitarian grounds. It is also important to 
point out here that some would argue that natural rights were articulated by Jesuits of the School of 
Salamanca long before the Enlightenment thinkers. 
14 Pinker (2002), p. 145. 
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Titanic. It was the mundane knowledge “of where particular icebergs happened to be 
located on a particular night” that was needed. 
So are humans rational? The answer to that question is beyond the scope of this 
paper. But we first point out that the answer must depend upon how the word is 
defined. As we have demonstrated already, various academic disciplines define the 
word in different ways. To confuse the matter more, prominent intellectuals within 
those disciplines do not even entirely agree on single definitions within their respective 
fields. Our stance (as it pertains to the role of government) is as follows: Who cares? 
The various human behavioral sciences have (in our minds) brought forth some new 
interesting questions about rational choice theory. It should be agreed upon that homo 
economicus is not the best way to describe homo sapiens.15 Humans waste money and 
other resources in order to not have to admit that sunk costs are sunk costs. Humans are 
easily suckered by the framing effect. These are fair points. So let us make clear once 
again that we only wish to challenge Thaler, Sunstein and Kahneman’s suggestion for 
what human irrationality should mean for the role of government.  
Let us review the logic as proposed by Thaler, Sunstein and Kahneman as it pertains 
to the role of government: 
 
1. Humans behave irrationally and sometimes make poor choices as a result.  
2. Governments can help individuals make better choices. 
 
But we must point out that Thaler, Sunstein and Kahneman have forgotten or 
ignored an important factor, which we address in point two below. Points three and 
four follow naturally as a result of point two being true. 
 
1. Humans behave irrationally and sometimes make poor choices as a result. 
2. Governments are run by irrationally-behaving humans. 
3. Therefore governments behave irrationally. 
4. Irrationally-behaving governments are in a poor position to help individuals 
make better choices. 
 
Are we really to believe that governments behave so much more rationally than 
humans do? Do the choices of governments not reflect short-sighted agendas due to 
election cycles and administration changes, party politics, competing interest groups, 
bureaucracy, and a whole host of other factors, making them all the more irrational?  
If rational means having access to unlimited information about choices and being 
able to conduct perfect and exact advanced computations about the benefits and 
consequences of each and consistently choosing options that result in the best long-term 
                                                          
15 Mises (2008), p. 62. 
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gains, then by that definition, we are not rational beings. (To use Thaler and Sunstein’s 
terminology, we Humans are not Econs). But to say that irrational humans need to be 
saved by irrational governments is a poor argument, and its intellectual framework is 
dangerous because it only serves to legitimize weak-minded legislators in search of 
scientific backing for their political agendas. 
When it comes to freedom (as in the right to self-determinism), we are less 
concerned with whether or not humans always behave rationally. We argue that a more 
important concept to understand is purposeful action. We also point out that only for 
simplification we have referred to government behavior and action. But it must be said 
that governments do not behave or act at all. Only the individuals that comprise them 
behave and act. Such is the topic of praxeology – the logic of human action, which we 
explain in the next section. 
To conclude this section briefly, we reiterate Bastiat’s argument, when government 
operates outside the boundaries of protecting justice, justice itself is sacrificed. Life, 
liberty, property are sacrificed. The integrity of the mind of man is sacrificed. If man is 
irrational, then allowing other irrational men to do his thinking for him by using 




RATIONALITY VS. PURPOSEFUL BEHAVIOUR: THE (NON)ROLE FOR 
GOVERNMENT 
 
We would like to move beyond the concept of rationality described so far, in order 
to follow a definition that, according to us, it is more suitable with the very nature of 
human behavior. In fact, the word ‘rationality’ has become very ambiguous over time, 
often confused with the possibility to measure mathematical quantities without error. In 
economics, moreover, rationality seems to mean to some that humans have a sort of 
omniscience, able to drive to perfect forecasts about the future course of events16. In this 
sense, ‘rationality’ is a word we prefer to disregard for now. 
In this regard, Hayek’s acceptance speech for the Nobel Prize in 1974 is memorable17. 
Taking up a number of crucial considerations expressed in Hayek (1964), Hayek (2008, 
p. 30) associates the persistent errors of economists with «their propensity to imitate as 
closely as possible the procedures of the brilliantly successful physical sciences». 
Economists, with the pretext of being ‘scientists’, imitate the methods of the natural 
sciences but in doing so apply an inappropriate method to the study of human sciences, 
                                                          
16 To be fair to Thaler and Sunstein, they make clear that they do not assume omniscience even for 
Econs. To our knowledge, Kahneman does not assume this either. 
17 Hayek (2008). 
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giving birth to utterly unscientific theories, since the method is not imposed by the 
object studied in accordance with the Aristotelian tradition but by the ideological 
preconceptions of the scholars themselves. 
Therefore, considering the very nature of human action, as in Ferlito (2013), and 
following Mises (1998, p. 11), we can define human action as “purposeful behavior.” 
This definition of human action is the foundation for the praxeological method founded 
by Ludwig von Mises and followed by important members of the Austrian School, such 
as Murray N. Rothbard and J. Huerta de Soto. 
  
Or we may say: Action is will put into operation and transformed into an agency, is aiming at 
ends and goals, is the ego’s meaningful response to stimuli and to the conditions of its 
environment, is a person’s conscious adjustment to the state of the universe that determines his life. 
(Mises, 1998, p. 11). 
 
Ends and means therefore are the given human action implemented through plans 
that take shape and are realized over time. As we can immediately understand, such a 
definition is much stronger than the concept of rationality. In fact, while the concept of 
rationality is quite controversial and seems to imply the idea of ‘success’, ‘coordination’, 
or ‘perfect outcome’, purposefulness seems to be a more undeniable feature of human 
behavior. All human action is, without a doubt, set in motion to reach goals. Purposeful 
action, moreover, can be seen as the link between preferences and expectations, stressed 
by Lachmann. Preferences generate expectations and the bridge between them is in the 
action, accomplished over time. From this simple truth the Austrian School of 
Economics derives more general observations of human action.  
First of all, it must be said that individuals prefer to achieve goals in the shortest 
time possible, ceteris paribus. This consideration leads us to a category closely related to 
that of capital in the Austrian theoretical tradition: the law of time preference, i.e., at par 
circumstances, present goods are preferred to future assets18. That is, faced with two 
objectives of equal value, the player prefers the one which can be achieved more 
rapidly19. However, any discussion of time requires a clarification as to which concept is 
consistent with our perspective. Following O’Driscoll and Rizzo (2002), we will explain 
the importance of differentiating real time from Newtonian time and link first to the 
inevitable ignorance that characterizes the process of human action. 
Dominant economic theory, especially of the neo-classical kind, uses the historic 
series and the Cartesian plane as tools for representing its results. It consequently seems 
to give importance to time. However, such a perception of time, while perhaps being 
useful in the study of physical sciences, is rather unsuitable for the discovery and 
                                                          
18 Concept introduced by Böhm-Bawerk in the 19th Century. See Schulak and Unterköfler (2011), p. 34. 
19 Huerta de Soto (2010a), pp. 45-46. 
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surprise dynamics typical of human action. It is what we may define as Newtonian 
time. 
 
The Newtonian conception of time is spatialized; that is, its passage is represented or 
symbolized by “movements” along a line. Different dates are then portrayed as a succession of line 
segments (discrete time) or points (continuous time). In either case, time is fully analogized to 
space, and what is true of the latter becomes true of the former. (O’Driscoll and Rizzo, 2002, p. 82). 
 
O’Driscoll and Rizzo (2002, pp. 82-85) emphasise that time conceived in this way has 
three main characteristics: homogeneity, mathematical continuity and causal inertia. 
Homogeneity means that different temporal moments are simply points in space, a 
temporal position; nothing may happen between one moment and another. This means 
that homogeneous time is fundamentally static. Mathematical continuity, on the other 
hand, implies that time is simply a sequence of moments, which may even be different, 
but no change can take place endogenously. Since time is a sequence of static situations, 
each change must be exogenous. Causal inertia, lastly, means that nothing happens 
with the flow of time. There is no learning; there is no change in knowledge or 
adjustment of expectations. The system itself must already contain all the elements 
needed for it to function. It is evident that while such a concept may fit the description 
of physical phenomena, where actions are always met by the same reactions, it lends 
itself poorly to representing unpredictable and dynamic human actions. 
What interests us, on the other hand, is real time, a «dynamically continuous flow of 
novel experiences. […] We cannot experience the passage of time except as a flow: 
something new must happen, or real time will cease to be»20. As described by O’Driscoll 
and Rizzo (2002, pp. 89-91), the characteristics of real time are precisely opposite to 
those of Newtonian time. They are: dynamic continuity, heterogeneity and causal 
efficacy. If we consider dynamic continuity, time must consist of memory and 
expectations; i.e. it is structurally related moments, past and future, through the 
perceptions of the individual; one cannot imagine a present without memory of the past 
and expectations for the future; inasmuch, all the moments in the flow of time are 
intimately linked and reciprocally influenced. Heterogeneity, on the other hand, means 
that in each successive moment the individual’s perception has of the facts may be, and 
in fact is, different: the past, once it has occurred, becomes memory, enhancing the 
present and thereby also changing perception of the future; therefore, the perception of 
things changes from moment to moment, thereby making the characteristics of a given 
moment in time radically different from those of the previous moment. The direct 
consequence of heterogeneity is causal efficacy; the flow of time modifies knowledge, 
awareness and information, thereby expanding the creative potential of human action. 
Yet this is possible precisely because of acquisitions made ‘beforehand’ in time. 
                                                          
20 O’Driscoll and Rizzo (2002), p. 89.  
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Given what we have outlined, it will be evident that uncertainty21 is one of the key 
elements in human action. On a closer look, we cannot even imagine that opportunities 
for profit will arise outside a context of uncertainty and disequilibrium22. In fact, 
without uncertainty, all occasions for profit would have already been exhausted; in an 
uncertain context, on the other hand, entrepreneurs who make the best forecasts or 
people who, for various reasons, best fulfil their expectations and plans, enjoy an 
advantage created precisely by the fact of knowing better how to move in such a 
context, how to ‘imagine the future better’. 
Once again, as for time, reference must be made to a ‘true’ concept of uncertainty 
and not to a formal stylization. The main features of true uncertainty «are the inherent 
unlistability of all possible outcomes resulting from a course of action, and the complete 
endogeneity of the uncertainty»23. Inasmuch, if uncertainty is endogenous to the system, 
an intrinsic feature, it cannot but originate a constantly changing system. 
In such a system, it is evident that even the acquisition of new information cannot 
eliminate uncertainty. The accumulation of knowledge merely changes the 
uncertainty24. The information content is not complete, only larger. Aspects affecting the 
pursuit of action have changed but are not complete. The outlines on the horizon, and 
consequently the uncertainty in relation to the complete form, are different. 
Such a vision is challenging the concept of rationality as it is mainly intended by 
economic theory, a concept according to which there is no room for general errors and 
that it is strictly related with the neoclassical view on general economic equilibrium. 
Equilibrium and rationality in neoclassical theory are absolutely incompatible with the 
concepts of real time and the mutability of knowledge. In fact, Walrasian equilibrium is 
incompatible with the real world. However, this does not mean that we must 
completely abandon every attempt to define certain situations of equilibrium in the 
system. In accordance with the Austrian tradition, the concept of equilibrium lies in the 
coordination of the plans of individual players on the market. In this sense, equilibrium 
can be allowed, but not in the sense that it enables “Pareto optimums”25 or perfect 
coordination26. The equilibrium may not exist as a point but as a process. What we have 
in mind is a situation in which individuals are effectively free to act and relate with each 
other; their knowledge is molded and modified through interaction, allowing the 
system as a whole to be understood better but not totally. This process of discovery, in an 
effort towards coordination and discovery, stimulates a constant tension towards 
balance. An equilibrium that, as a destination, does not exist or at least is constantly 
                                                          
21 See in particular O'Driscoll and Rizzo (2002), chapter 5.  
22 Rizzo (1979b), p. 10.  
23 O’Driscoll and Rizzo (2002), p. 100.  
24 O’Driscoll and Rizzo (2002), pp. 102-103.  
25 Not even imagined by Pareto himself. 
26 O’Driscoll and Rizzo (2002), pp. 117-118.  
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changing. Yet it exists as a procedural dynamics. The free coordination of plans is not a 
destination but a journey. In any case, 
 
there is nothing that requires a useful equilibrium idea to function as a center of gravitation in 
respect to each and every movement in disequilibrium. It is sufficient that there be movements in a 
equilibrating [sic] direction often enough to make the toil and trouble of equilibrium construction 
worthwhile. Obviously this is a matter of scientific judgment, rather of scientific precision. (Rizzo, 
2002, pp. 186-187). 
 
Equilibrium, therefore and in accordance with our vision, does not involve 
achieving a condition of static optimality but, rather, a dynamic situation in which 
market players are free to act in seeking fulfilment of their plans. The equilibrium lies in 
the true possibility for these agents to enact the dynamic process needed to implement 
their plans: definition of purposes, search for means, intertemporal coordination in 
interaction with other subjects, discovery of new information, redefinition of plans, etc. 
Our idea is very close to the one expressed by Rizzo (2002). 
In regards to the definition of the action process in a climate of uncertainty, and the 
subsequent definition of a state of dynamic equilibrium in the sense defined above27, the 
key element is the concept of expectations: the desires for the future and scenarios that 
we expect will occur determine our possibilities for action. The evolution of the concept 
of preferences towards the concept of expectations can be considered as one of the 
major innovations produced by methodological subjectivism in the last century28. And it 
is a perfect instrument for our analysis. If human action is basically shaped by the 
concept of “purpose,” of course purposes are in themselves shaped by expectations. 
It is evident that expectations cannot be considered, as in neoclassical theory, as a 
static element fixed at the beginning of the match and then unchangeable until the final 
result is achieved. On the contrary, since human action is a dynamic process that 
unfolds over time, the set of information available to players constantly changes, 
bringing about a continual modification of expectations, objectives and plans. 
The economist who most deeply analyzed the concept of expectations, re-
interpreting them dynamically and inserting them in the Austrian theoretical paradigm, 
was Ludwig M. Lachmann, a German author who, in the sphere of our most recent 
thinking, is proving to have a decisive influence. His early works from the 1930s and 
1940s helped develop the Austrian theory of capital and the business cycle theory. 
However, his opera magna, Capital and Its Structure29, published in 1956, sought to 
include the concept of uncertainty and expectations firmly in the Austrian theory. 
                                                          
27 As a never-ending process of action pursuing the satisfaction of personal expectations.  
28 Lachmann (1979), p. 65. 
29 Lachmann (1978).  
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Acknowledging Keynes’s important function in having introduced the concept of 
expectations in an organic way with A Treatise on Money (1930), and referring Shackle’s 
contribution30, an ‘Austrian’ turned partially Keynesian31, Lachmann sought to engage 
his own contribution completely within the Austrian tradition, albeit with the necessary 
distinctions. In particular, he felt that the Austrians missed the opportunity to insert 
expectations within their own thinking in an organic way. 
 
It is a curious fact that, when around 1930 (in Keynes’s Treatise on Money) expectations made 
their appearance in the economic thought of the Anglo-Saxon world, the Austrians failed to grasp 
with both hands this golden opportunity to enlarge the basis of their approach and, by and large, 
treated the subject rather gingerly. (Lachmann, 1976a, p. 58). 
 
Lachmann embraces Shackle’s concept of the kaleidic society32, «a society in which 
sooner or later unexpected change is bound to upset existing patterns, a society 
‘interspersing its moments or intervals of order, assurance and beauty with sudden 
disintegration and a cascade into a new pattern’»33. In contrast, for Hayek, the definition 
of a dynamic balance, based on the coordination of plans, in any case requires a certain 
closeness to a situation of general economic equilibrium34.  
Expectations are consequently the hallmark of a society made of real players which, 
starting precisely from them, form their own plans for the future, meeting and 
modifying knowledge and the plans themselves. This generates the kaleidoscopic world, a 
world where change is constant. In a kaleidoscopic society, moreover, 
 
the equilibrating forces, operating slowly, especially where much of the capital equipment is 
durable and specific, are always overtaken by unexpected change before they have done their 
work, and the results of their operation disrupted before they can bear fruit. […] Equilibrium of the 
economic system as a whole will thus never be reached. (Lachmann, 1976a, pp. 60-61). 
 
Expectations, by generating plans, generate purposeful human action that is the 
necessary for economic processes35. As time progresses, expectations change during the 
process. With the accumulation of knowledge, the scenario is constantly changing. In 
our view, it is precisely – provided it is free – in the harmonic process of continuous 
                                                          
30 George Lennox Sharman Shackle (1903-1992) was born in Cambridge and is therefore British. Our 
definition of him as ‘Austrian’ refers to his scientific approach. He earned his Ph.D. at the London School 
of Economics in the 1930s under the guidance of Hayek. 
31 As told by Rothbard, Lachmann was fond of saying: «When I arrived in London in the early 1930s, 
it was safe to say that everyone at the London School of Economics was an Austrian. After the war, 
however, Hayek and I were the only Austrians left». 
32 See Shackle (2009), pp. 76-79.  
33 Lachmann (1976a), p. 54.  
34 Rizzo (2002), p. 184. 
35 As Hicks (2002), p. 284 said, «production will not be undertaken unless expectations are formed». 
23 
 
adaptation of plans and expectations that our conception of equilibrium lies. Yet, bear 
in mind, that expectations are not something ‘up in the clouds’; without them, there is 
no economic activity at all; it is starting from expectations that every decision is taken 
with the intention of making a profit or achieving personal satisfaction. However, these 
attempts emerge in a context of imperfect knowledge and an unexpected and 
unpredictable future36. And, again, dynamic equilibrium does not lie in the coherence of 
expectations but rather in the individual process which each agent enacts in the attempt 
to achieve them.  
It may seem that we have probably gone too far in our analysis. But this is not the 
case. Just to make perfectly clear: we have given up the concept of human rationality 
because it is ambiguous and a source of misunderstanding in psychological and 
economic analysis. We prefer to define human action as marked by purposefulness, 
which, put another way, means human beings always act in order to achieve 
something. In doing so they are guided by their expectations. And, finally, expectations 
are the driving force for both plans and actions. 
We make no claims that only neoclassical economists have built arguments upon the 
belief that humans are rational. Ludwig von Mises himself argued the following: 
 
Human action is always rational... The ultimate end of action is always the satisfaction of some 
desires of the acting man. Since nobody is in a position to substitute his own value judgments for those of 
the acting individual, it is vain to pass judgment on other people's aims and violations. No man is 
qualified to declare what would make another man happier or less discontented. (Mises, 2008, p. 18). 
 
So Kahneman was right when he wrote that the meaning of rationality in the field of 
economics is «not whether a person’s beliefs and preferences are reasonable, but 
whether they are internally consistent» (2011, p. 411). A rational person could indeed 
believe in ghosts as long as other beliefs reflect consistency in this belief. Do humans 
always reach the optimum? In a way we can answer ‘yes’. But only if we consider this 
optimum objectively limited by limited and changing information. In other words, 
given the content of information that they have, humans behave consistently with their 
ever-changing plans. This of course means that humans cannot pursue all their goals at 
the same time. Choice is at the core of the action process. 
 
The acting person therefore has to identify to the best of his abilities the alternative that, under 
the given circumstances, is for him the most important one. 
This identification process is future-oriented and, therefore, heavily speculative. […] 
Now, subjectively – that is, as far as the mere opinion of the acting person is concerned – he 
always chooses the most important project. By the very fact that he acts in this manner rather than 
another, he “demonstrates” his belief that this action is better than any other he could have 
performed instead. Ex ante, then, his choice is always optimal. (Hülsmann, 2000, p. 4). 
                                                          




It is only ex post that is possible to judge whether or not we had or not better 
alternatives. But, at the very moment of the choice, the chosen alternative was the best, 
consistently with the content of knowledge at our disposal.  
From our perspective, thus, government control is not conceivable on the basis that 
humans are not rational, and we explain why. The argument for government 
intervention over ‘human irrationality’ is based on, as we stated above, the academic 
attempt to treat economics and human action sciences as physical sciences. Government 
planning and intervention, in fact, is based on the erroneous notion that governments 
can be rational while humans are not. So, how is it then that the central planner is more 
rational than all others, and how is it then that the central planner has more perfect 
information at his disposal?  
It is now necessary to compare our idea of human action with the specular one for 
government control, one that we generally define as socialism. Following Huerta de Soto 
(2010b, p. 3), we define socialism as «any system of institutional aggression on the free 
exercise of human action or entrepreneurship». It is evident, therefore, that our 
definition is much broader than generally is intended. If the essence of economic theory 
is the study of human action (as above defined), and if «the core, or most characteristic 
feature of human nature is the ability of all people to act freely and creatively»37, there is 
evidently no point in identifying nuances in regards to the degree of aggression that 
State action may have in relation to free human action. These considerations are based 
on an authentic conception of man and entrepreneurship. 
 
In a broad or general sense, entrepreneurship actually coincides with human action. In this 
respect, it could be said that any person who acts to modify the present and achieve his objectives 
in the future exercises entrepreneurship. Although at first glance this definition may appear to be 
too broad and to disagree with current linguistic uses, let us bear in mind that it coincides with a 
conception of entrepreneurship which economists are increasingly studying and developing. 
Moreover, this conception fully agrees with the original etymological meaning of the term 
“enterprise.” (Huerta de Soto, 2010b, p. 15). 
 
All subjects, in performing the entrepreneurial function38 defined in this way, set 
themselves objectives and purposes dictated by their expectations. Having defined the 
objectives, the means for achieving them must be chosen in a process that unfolds over 
time. The attainment of certain objectives naturally involves costs, arising from the 
subjective perception of renouncing the attainment of other goals. The expectation is 
that the subjective benefit obtained on attaining the objective is higher than 
                                                          
37 Huerta de Soto (2010b), p. 3. 
38 For in-depth analysis of the concept of entrepreneurship, see Huerta de Soto (2010b), pp. 15-48. 
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cost/sacrifice. The concept of entrepreneurial profit lies in this difference39. This does not 
mean that losses may not be incurred or entrepreneurial errors be made. That is, over 
time, entrepreneurs may realize that errors were made in the choice of means and 
purposes and that these entrepreneurial activities must therefore be reviewed40. This is 
possible precisely because, through the free exercise of human action, discovering the 
error increases the heritage of information. The nature of economic calculation lies in 
this comparison between entrepreneurial gains and losses. In a market regime, such 
assessments are possible because subjective assessments, in terms of income and 
sacrifice, are transformed into objective values through the price mechanism. It 
precisely mirrors the subjective meeting of subjective assessments that, in meeting, 
generate objectively weighted and quantifiable assessments. 
This definition of human action and entrepreneurship is flanked by a corresponding 
idea of socialism. 
 
We shall define “socialism” as any system of institutional aggression on the free exercise of 
entrepreneurship. By “aggression” or “coercion” we mean all physical violence or threats of 
physical violence which another person or group of people initiates and employs against the actor. 
As a result of this coercion, the actor, who otherwise would have freely exercised his 
entrepreneurship, is forced, in order to avoid greater evils, to act differently than he would have 
acted in other circumstances, and thus to modify his behaviour and adapt it to the ends of the 
person or persons who are coercing him. We could consider aggression, when defined in this way, 
to be the quintessential antihuman action. This is so because coercion keeps a person from freely 
exercising his entrepreneurship. In other words […] it prevents a person from pursuing those 
objectives he discovers and from employing the means he deems within his reach, according to his 
information or knowledge, to help him achieve them. Therefore, aggression is an evil, because it 
precludes man from engaging in the activity which is most characteristic of him and which by its 
essence most intimately befits his nature. (Huerta de Soto, 2010b, p. 49). 
 
Given these definitions, the vision of the Austrian School of Economics suggests that 
a dynamic equilibrium, where human actions seek to coordinate themselves in order to 
complete their projects, can be achieved only if those actions are carried out freely. 
(More on what we mean by ‘dynamic equilibrium’ later). This does not mean that all 
plans will be brought to fruition made and that a static and perfect equilibrium will be 
achieved, as assumed by neoclassical theory. Yet, in a free society, individuals have the 
chance to learn from their mistakes and thereby correct plans and expectations in 
keeping with what has been learned from the error and the new information content 
acquired from interaction with other individuals. In the socialist perspective, on the 
other hand, it is impossible for a central planner to gather all the data needed to 
produce a perfect rational economic calculation. In this way, the central authority, after 
                                                          
39 Huerta de Soto (2010b), pp. 17-18. 
40 Huerta de Soto (2010b), p. 18. 
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collecting the necessary information from the minds of individuals, provides all the new 
information to the players, in terms of prices, the goods to produce, how many, etc. 
The Austrians respond to this vision with two main objections, largely and 
organically developed by the brilliant analysis of Prof. Huerta de Soto. Firstly, the type 
of information that each subject possesses, of an exclusive character, is by nature tacit 
and cannot be articulated. This means that it is «logically impossible for this 
information to be transmitted to the governing body»41. In fact, the problem is not 
merely quantitative; the data is both enormous and dispersed among many individuals, 
as well impossible to transmit to any planning organ42. This argument, which we could 
define as static, can be flanked by a dynamic argument: the information available to 
individuals is not given once and for all; rather, it is continuously modified, so that – in 
a dynamic process taking place in real time – expectations and plans change with it. 
 
Socialism is impossible, not only because the information actors possess is by its very nature 
explicitly non-transmissible, but also because, from a dynamic standpoint, when people exercise 
entrepreneurship, that is, when they act, they constantly create and discover new information. 
Moreover, it is hardly possible to transmit to the governing body information or knowledge which 
has not yet been created, but which gradually emerges as a result of the social process itself, to the 
extent that this process is not assaulted. (Huerta de Soto, 2010b, p. 54). 
 
It is clear, then, that in a socialist system, the mediator role played by the 
assessments provided by the price system is absent. Since there are no subjective 
assessments, because everything is determined by the central authorities, prices cannot 
exist. And without prices there can be no rational economic calculation. In a planned 
society, only numbers imposed from above can exist. But they are not prices. This is 
because, as we have seen, the essence of price lies in the assessment of the subject. If 
there is no assessment, there is no price. 
As a result, we can see how the nature of the problem does not consist in one system 
of equations or another to be solved but, rather, in understanding how human action 
and related knowledge actually take part in the market process. Even if a central 
planning body had a certain amount of information at is disposition, judged good 
enough to determine a plan, the fundamental problem is that, once the plan is notified 
to the individuals, during its implementation the information resumes its dynamic 
process of change, thereby making the data used to define the plan already ‘old’. Yet 
this does not mean to say that no plans exist in economic action. Quite the opposite. 
Plans are continually implemented by individuals in an effort to attain their objectives. 
And we must not conclude that the knowledge available to individuals is perfect, given 
and unchangeable. On the contrary, it is constantly changing. However, in the process 
                                                          
41 Huerta de Soto (2010b), p. 54. 
42 Huerta de Soto (2010b), p. 54. 
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of interaction between individuals, the dynamic process of acquiring information can 
take place over time and allow plans to change accordingly, in the ceaseless search for 
mutual coordination. In a more or less planned system, however, it is assumed that data 
remain unchanged for a period of time that is long enough to allow the plan to be 
implemented; this assumption, by evidently distorting reality, contains the core for the 
failure of every planning experiment. 
The general constructivist mistake embodied in the government attempt to plan, 
control, suggest and direct is clearly explained by Hayek when talking about full 
employment policies. 
 
The theory which has been guiding monetary and financial policy during the last thirty years, 
and which I contend is largely the product of such a mistaken conception of the proper scientific 
procedure, consists in the assertion that there exists a simple positive correlation between total 
employment and the size of the aggregate demand for goods and services; it leads to the belief that 
we can permanently assure full employment by maintaining total money expenditure at an 
appropriate level. Among the various theories advanced to account for extensive unemployment, 
this is probably the only one in support of which strong quantitative evidence can be adduced. I 
nevertheless regard it as fundamentally false. (Hayek, 2008, pp. 31-32). 
 
Hayek consequently argued that, in the social field, a theory cannot be true merely 
because it is quantitatively demonstrable. Let’s take an example. We could take the 
distribution of GDP in European countries and, for the same countries, the number of 
people with large ears. We may, quite by chance, discover a positive correlation 
between large ears and high rates of growth in GDP. Should one consequently conclude 
that having large ears stimulates the economy? This is evidently a paradox. What is 
missing is the scientific logic underlying the question. Nonetheless, econometrics could 
prove that such a correlation exists and produce a theory, which is “exact” in formal 
terms but blatantly false from the point of view of logic. And this also helps eliminate 
the misconception that what can be proven mathematically is also true. 
In complex phenomena, fundamental data are often not measurable. If our analysis 
were to refer only to measurable entities, we would be obliged to restrict the field of 
investigation to a great extent. It is consequently the case today that those who believe 
they have a truly scientific approach because they do nothing other than correlate series 
of data in a search for functional relationships, actually produce theories which are 
extremely limited and most unlikely to say anything useful about reality43. 
Consequently, ignorance of true economic science and the presumption that science 
                                                          
43 Hayek (2008), p. 42: «I still doubt whether their search for measurable magnitudes has made 
significant contributions to our theoretical understanding of economic phenomena – as distinct from their 
value as a description of particular situations. Nor am I prepared to accept the excuse that this branch of 
research is still very young: Sir William Petty, the founder of econometrics, was after all a somewhat 
senior colleague of Sir Isaac Newton in the Royal Society!». 
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can only be based on measurable quantities has culminated in producing massive 
damage in the real world. The presumption of providing exact requirements in time 
and space, of being able to determine the level of employment exactly starting from 
planned fixing of aggregate demand, has created a «very extensive misallocation of 
resources which is likely to make later large-scale unemployment inevitable»44. 
The Hayekian method does not allow exact forecasts predictions and ‘provable’ 
cures. Nevertheless, it helps explain the phenomenon of unemployment and a general 
reading of the effects of inflationary policies on the production system and employment 
itself.  
 
But the effects on policy of the more ambitious constructions have not been very fortunate and 
I confess that I prefer true but imperfect knowledge, even if it leaves much indetermined and 
unpredictable, to a pretense of exact knowledge that is likely to be false. (Hayek, 2008, pp. 43-44). 
 
Yet what are the long term consequences of the pretextual science of those 
economists who intend to act only by means of measurability? There are certainly 
erroneous expectations by and about economic scientists. One cannot expect the 
economy to produce forecasts based on the model of natural sciences. The insistence on 
the ‘scientific’ method may generate faulty expectations, manipulation and trust in very 
dangerous social engineering plans. This is the most serious consequence. If the 
economy is like physics, then why not rely on economists as apprentice sorcerers who, 
using exact formulas, can generate social welfare, cancel unemployment and distribute 
wealth equitably? All attempts to do so have led to the construction of earthly hells 
rather than paradises45. Yet the 
 
welfare of a people, like the happiness of a man, depends on a great many things that can be 
provided in an infinite variety of combinations. It cannot be adequately expressed as a single end, but 
only as a hierarchy of ends, a comprehensive scale of values in which every need of every person is given 
its place. To direct all our activities according to a single plan presupposes that every one of our needs is 
given its rank in an order of values which must be complete enough to make it possible to decide 
between all the different courses between which the planner has to choose. It presupposes, in short, the 
existence of a complete ethical code in which all the different human values are allotted their due place. 
(Hayek, 2006, p. 60). 
 
Yet the problem is that such a comprehensive code of ethics able to organize society 
in hierarchical terms in accordance with a precise scale of purposes and values, cannot 
exist and be defined. In particular, it cannot be defined by way of imposition. The State 
as an organization cannot allow itself to identify such a code of ethics. If such an 
                                                          
44 Hayek (2008, p. 44). 
45 Writes Hölderlin, quoted in Hayek (2006, p. 24): «What has always made the state a hell on earth 
has been precisely that man has tried to make it his heaven». 
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identification was possible in times when the Empire was a spiritual entity46, capable of 
harmonizing the common ideals of peoples, today, with the advent of post-French 
Revolution nation states, this step is no longer possible. On closer thought, it will be 
seen that even in the times of the Holy Roman Empire the ideal and spiritual 
identification of the political entity as a representative of the hierarchy of values came 
about as the reflection of system of ideas shared at the base of the system itself – and not 
imposed from above. The Empire was the inevitable form of organization of a vision 
that arose elsewhere, through sharing a common teleological vision of individual and 
social action. Without such widespread sharing, reflection in the high level politics 
simply cannot be implemented. This is why corporatism failed during fascism or at 
least was unable to perform the function it had during the Middle Ages. The prevailing 
sociopolitical and ideal system, however, does not allow any organization other than a 
democratic one; the most one can expect is the shared agreement to define a framework 
of common rules. For the rest, individuals must be free to act in order to implement 
their plans. 
As we have seen so far, serious analysis of central planning cannot but lead to the 
conclusion that, in order to be implemented it has to be conducted through more or less 
accentuated forms of dictatorship47. The freedom that planners promise is nothing more 
than freedom from the responsibility of deciding for oneself, freedom from action and 
from decisions with all the weight of personal responsibility that it entails48. The desire 
for presumed equality and an easy life can destroy the longing for liberty, because true 
freedom always implies responsibility.  
A society can only progress through free individual action, and economists should 
be servants to this principle rather than slaves to artificial systems of ideas49, which 
often become the justification for absurd policies and restricting freedom by ever 
increasing degrees. Therefore we stress that social scientists should acknowledge that 
planning cannot be implemented for the overall betterment of society unless the 
intended goal is collective suffering. 
 
The recognition of the insuperable limits to his knowledge ought indeed to teach the student of 
society a lesson of humility which should guard him against becoming an accomplice in men’s fatal 
                                                          
46 On this topic, see in particular Perez (2004). 
47 Hayek (2006), pp. 91-92. 
48 Hayek (2006), p. 95. 
49 Hayek (1992), pp. 53-54: «One’s initial surprise at finding that intelligent people tend to be socialists 
diminishes when one realises that, of course, intelligent people will tend to overvalue intelligence, and to 
suppose that we must owe all the advantages and opportunities that our civilisation offers to deliberate 
design rather than to following traditional rules, and likewise to suppose that we can, by exercising our 
reason, eliminate any remaining undesirable features by still more intelligent reflection, and still more 
appropriate design and ‘rational coordination’ or our undertakings. This leads one to be favourably 
disposed to the central economic planning and control that lie at the heart of socialism». 
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striving to control society – a striving which makes him not only a tyrant over his fellows, but 
which may well make him the destroyer of a civilization which no brain has designed but which 






In conclusion, we have demonstrated that various academic disciplines have each 
their own very different concept of what rationality is, so any debate concerning 
rationality without first addressing the various denotative and connotative meanings is 
pointless to say the least. Humans are easily influenced by the framing effect; they often 
prefer short term pleasure to long-term health (as in the case of harmful drug usage). 
These are fair critiques of human rationality; we do not deny it. But so what if humans 
often behave irrationally (or are at least “not well described by the rational-agent 
model” as Kahneman has put it)? There need not be only two options: 1) irrational and 
therefore subject to government control or 2) perfectly-rational and therefore allowed to 
be free. There is at least one alternative option that seems to be largely ignored in 
academia: free to err, learn, and shape one’s own destiny – regardless of what others 
may label as rational or irrational.  
We point out the flawed logic of the economic and political solutions offered by 
many of the critics of free markets. To remind the reader, the argument usually goes as 
follows: Humans behave irrationally; therefore governments should control human 
action. The error lies in forgetting that governments only exist and only take any action 
at all because of the actions of the individuals that comprise them. So if it is concluded 
that individuals behave irrationally, then so do governments (or more specifically, the 
individual actors comprising governments behave irrationally). What is more, Cass 
Sunstein – one of most prominent intellectuals that has gained a great deal of attention 
in recent years for his proposed government solutions to the human irrationality 
problem – went on to become a central planner himself and has contradicted his own 
“libertarian” solutions to the irrationality problem in at least one of his other books. 
This is to us – to put it in Sowellian terms – revealing of his Unconstrained/Utopian 
Vision, which seems to underlie not only his beliefs but also of many like him.  
In this paper we have defined humans as purposeful actors rather than rational 
agents. The word ‘rational’ is too open to ambiguity. This implies expectations and 
plans. Plans are based on the present knowledge and accomplished over time. But in a 
process that happens in time, the content of knowledge, dispersed among millions of 
individuals, is continuously changing, according to the keleidic view of Lachmann. This 
means that expectations and plans are also continuously revised. Every action implies 
choices that are ‘rational’ ex ante, because they are consistent with the available 
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knowledge, but these actions are continuously revised because of the mutable character 
of knowledge.  
On this basis, any government plan is inconceivable for the simple fact that in a free 
society the content of information can flow among human beings, bringing them to 
revise their plans and actions (which is how the price mechanism works). By contrast, 
government action is necessarily static but is based on information that is not static at 
all. So the transmission of knowledge, due to government intervention, becomes 
impossible, avoiding the coordination process among individual plans. 
Therefore, accepting the concept of purposeful action is to affirm the very subjective 
nature of human behavior.  
 
The market process is the outward manifestation of an unending stream of knowledge. […] 
The pattern of knowledge is continuously changing in society, a process hard to describe. 
Knowledge defies all attempts to treat it as a ‘datum’ or an object in time and space. (Lachmann, 1976b, p. 
127). 
 
Embracing this view means to reject any government intervention option, because of 
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